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ARTICLES 
MANDATORY RULES 
Scott Dodson* 
Whether a limitation is jurisdictional or not is an important but often 
obscure question. In an article published in Northwestern University Law 
Review, I proposed a framework for courts to resolve the issue in a principled 
way, but I left open the next logical question: what does it mean if a rule is 
characterized as nonjurisdictional? Jurisdictional rules generally have a clearly 
defined set of traits: they are not subject to equitable exceptions, consent, waiver, 
or forfeiture; they can be raised at any time; and they can be raised by any party 
or the court sua sponte. This jurisdictional rigidity has led courts and 
commentators to overlook the fact that nonjurisdictional rules need not be the 
mirror inverse but may instead have attributes commonly associated with 
jurisdictionality. A nonjurisdictional rule might, for example, be “mandatory,” 
meaning that it is subject to waiver or forfeiture, but if properly raised by the 
party for whose benefit it lies, it has the jurisdictional-like attribute of being 
immune to equitable exceptions. This Article is the first to take a hard look at 
nonjurisdictional rules and, particularly, “mandatory” rules. It first argues that 
they have an important institutional role to play in our procedural system. It then 
shows that, in practice, mandatory but nonjurisdictional characterizations may 
help explain a number of perplexing doctrines. As an example, the Article 
demonstrates how such a characterization can help reconcile the convoluted 
doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Ultimately, the Article suggests that a 
greater appreciation for mandatory rules both can benefit the procedural system 
and can broaden our view of what salutary roles nonjurisdictional rules can play. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How does one determine whether a particular rule is jurisdictional or not? 
Over the last few years, the Court has focused on this question. Since 2004, the 
Court has determined that Bankruptcy Rule 4004, which gives a Chapter 7 
creditor sixty days after the first creditors’ meeting to object to debtor 
discharge,1 is nonjurisdictional;2 that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
33(b)(2), which sets a time limit to file a motion for a new trial,3 is 
nonjurisdictional;4 that Title VII’s “employee-numerosity requirement”5 is a 
nonjurisdictional element of the claim;6 and that the time limit to extend the 
filing of a notice of appeal in a civil lawsuit7 is jurisdictional.8 And, just a few 
months ago, the Court decided that the six-year statute of limitations in the 
Tucker Act is a quasi-jurisdictional bar to suit.9 
The Court is right to be attentive. Whether a rule is jurisdictional or not 
affects both litigants and the courts in important ways. Though I believe that 
the Court has yet to develop a principled framework for resolving the issue,10 
1. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a). 
2. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 447 (2004). 
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(2). 
4. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15-19 (2005) (per curiam). 
5. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504 (2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 
(2000). 
6. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514-16. 
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2000). 
8. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
9. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008). 
10. See Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55 
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the Court is correct to recognize the issue as an important one and to continue 
to strive for a workable and sensible resolution. 
But the jurisdictional inquiry also implicates another question of equal 
importance, but that has received less attention and thought. What does the 
determination that a rule is jurisdictional or not mean? For a jurisdictional rule, 
the answer is (usually) easy.11 A jurisdictional rule can be raised by any party 
at any time, including for the first time on appeal; it obligates the court to 
police compliance sua sponte; and it is not subject to principles of equity, 
waiver, forfeiture, consent, or estoppel.12 
By contrast, the effects of a nonjurisdictional characterization are far less 
studied. Often, courts and commentators simply assume that nonjurisdictional 
rules have all of the inverse effects of jurisdictional rules: that is, they must be 
raised by a particular party by a particular time or they are forfeited; they are 
subject to consent and waiver and estoppel; and they are subject to principles of 
equity. Thus, some courts and commentators have assumed that if a rule has 
any attributes of jurisdictionality, it must be jurisdictional, and that if a rule is 
nonjurisdictional, then it must have no attributes of jurisdictionality.13 In 
addition, that assumption is made without any meaningful discussion of what 
attributes the nonjurisdictional rule in question should have as an institutional, 
analytical, or normative matter.14 As I will explain, that assumption is wrong, 
and reliance on it reflects a deep misunderstanding of, and underappreciation 
for, nonjurisdictional rules. 
This Article is the first to take a hard look at nonjurisdictional rules and the 
important roles they can play. Part I illustrates how courts and commentators 
have tended to confine nonjurisdictional rules to the mirror inverse of 
jurisdictional rules, and it exposes this rigid treatment of jurisdictional and 
nonjurisdictional rules as a false dichotomy. Nonjurisdictional rules need not 
have the opposite effects of jurisdictional rules—nor do they invariably in 
practice. The point is that characterizing a rule as nonjurisdictional does not tell 
us much about the rule’s effects, and identifying a particular jurisdictional 
attribute of a rule does not tell us whether the rule is jurisdictional or not. As a 
result, courts and commentators falling victim to this false dichotomy often 
commit one of two errors. Either they erroneously mischaracterize a 
nonjurisdictional rule as jurisdictional, or they erroneously mischaracterize a 
nonjurisdictional rule as having no jurisdictional effects. 
Part II argues that this false dichotomy also obscures the opportunity to 
explore a more nuanced approach, in which a nonjurisdictional rule has some, 
but not all, of the attributes commonly associated with jurisdictionality. As an 
(2008) (developing such a framework). 
11. See infra note 15. 
12. See infra note 16. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 17-19. 
14. See infra note 17. 
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example, this Part focuses on the importance of the oft-overlooked 
“mandatory” rule, a species of nonjurisdictional rules that has both 
nonjurisdictional and jurisdictional effects. A mandatory rule is susceptible to 
waiver, forfeiture, and consent, and it need not be policed by the court sua 
sponte. But it is, like jurisdictional rules, immune to equitable excuses for 
noncompliance. The benefits of such a rule are important, though—
unfortunately—overlooked. 
Part III argues that closer attention to nonjurisdictional rules with 
jurisdictional attributes can have a positive doctrinal impact. Shedding the 
blinders of the false dichotomy can help explain and conceptualize some of the 
more curious doctrinal anomalies. State sovereign immunity is one example. 
Though often characterized as a jurisdictional doctrine, it can be waived or 
consented to. The false dichotomy separating nonjurisdictional rules from 
jurisdictional rules has no place for this strange doctrine, and, as a result, 
scholars and courts have struggled to explain it. But taking the blinders off 
reveals that a mandatory characterization goes a long way towards reconciling 
the anomaly and bringing some consistency to what has been a tortuous 
doctrine. 
I conclude by zooming out to a broader view. A greater appreciation for 
nonjurisdictional rules with jurisdictional attributes can alleviate blind 
adherence to the false dichotomy and potentially be a powerful tool for a richer 
understanding of both complex and everyday doctrines. 
I. UNDERSTANDING NONJURISDICTIONAL RULES 
Nonjurisdictional rules are routinely misunderstood. If a court decrees a 
rule to be nonjurisdictional, its next step often is not analytical at all, but 
instead is formalistic: the court simply gives the nonjurisdictional rule the 
inverse effects of jurisdictionality, without further analysis. As I explain in 
more detail below, that dispensation is too facile. 
A. Avoiding the False Dichotomy 
Jurisdictional rules (usually) have clear and well-settled effects.15 A 
15. I say “usually” because there are at least three areas in which a jurisdictional rule’s 
effects might be more complicated. First, the rule might be jurisdictional without implicating 
subject-matter jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction, for example, can be waived. Second, a 
jurisdictional rule might have nonjurisdictional preconditions. Appellate jurisdiction, for 
example, will not attach without a notice of appeal being filed, but what constitutes a notice 
may be subject to some equitable flexibility. Third, a rule could be jurisdictional yet also 
contemplate, either expressly or implicitly, the effects of equity or waiver. The deadline to 
file a notice of appeal in a civil case, for example, may be jurisdictional, but the statute 
governing that deadline specifically allows courts to extend it for certain equitable reasons. 
See generally Scott Dodson, Appreciating Mandatory Rules: A Reply to Critics, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. COLLOQUY 228 (2008), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2008/02/ 
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jurisdictional rule can be raised by any party at any time, including for the first 
time on appeal; it obligates the court to police compliance sua sponte; and it is 
not subject to principles of equity, waiver, forfeiture, consent, or estoppel.16 
By contrast, nonjurisdictional rules do not have the same rigid effects. 
Nevertheless, courts and commentators have tended to express 
nonjurisdictional rules as having the inverse effects of jurisdictional rules.17 
Even the Supreme Court has contributed to the trend. In Day v. McDonough, 
the Court stated that nonjurisdictional deadlines are subject to waiver and 
forfeiture and impose no obligation on courts to raise them sua sponte.18 
Thus, as Perry Dane has noted in the specific context of time prescriptions, 
the characterization question “always rests on an explicit contrast. . . . [I]f a 
time limit is jurisdictional, the court will read it or treat it one way; if it is not 
jurisdictional, the court will read it or treat it another way.”19 The assumption 
behind the question is that a jurisdictional characterization has one set of effects 
and a nonjurisdictional characterization has a wholly different set of effects. 
This automatic characterization of nonjurisdictional rules as the inverse of 
jurisdictional rules—that they are subject to waiver, consent, forfeiture, and 
equitable exceptions and that they need not be raised (or cannot be raised) sua 
sponte by the court—is erroneous. 
appreciating-ma.html (exploring these possibilities). Both for simplicity’s sake and to focus 
the discussion on the underexplored nonjurisdictional side of the equation, I will confine 
“jurisdictional” to matters of subject-matter jurisdiction and avoid ruminating, at least for 
now, on different species of jurisdictional rules. 
16. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[S]ubject-matter 
jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or 
waived.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (stating that courts 
have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even 
if not challenged by any party); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 
U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (setting out characteristics of subject-matter jurisdiction). 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, No. 06-51399, 2007 WL 2693073, at *1 (5th Cir. 
Sept. 10, 2007) (per curiam) (“[T]ime limits not imposed by statute are not jurisdictional. 
The specific implication is that these time limits may be waived.” (internal citations 
omitted)); Cook v. United States, No. 06-5276, 2007 WL 2566014, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 
2007) (“[J]urisdictional rules are mandatory; therefore, their time limits cannot be waived. 
On the other hand, claim-processing rules are not jurisdictional—thus, their time limits can 
be waived.” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); E. King Poor, Jurisdictional 
Deadlines in the Wake of Kontrick and Eberhart: Harmonizing 160 Years of Precedent, 40 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 181, 208 n.172 (2007) (“The importance of the distinction [between 
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional characterizations] was that non-jurisdictional deadlines 
are subject to equitable exceptions, described as ‘waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.’” 
(quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982))). 
18. 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) (“A statute of limitations defense . . . is not 
‘jurisdictional,’ hence courts are under no obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte.” 
(emphasis in original)); id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have repeatedly stated that the 
enactment of time-limitation periods such as that in § 2244(d), without further elaboration, 
produces defenses that are nonjurisdictional and thus subject to waiver and forfeiture.”). 
19. Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1, 12 (1994). 
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In truth, nonjurisdictional rules do not have so rigid a set of effects as 
jurisdictional rules. Indeed, many nonjurisdictional rules exhibit some attributes 
of jurisdictionality. For example, certain nonjurisdictional bankruptcy rules 
may not be susceptible to consent or equitable exception.20 Certain 
nonjurisdictional criminal procedure rules have been characterized as 
“inflexible,” suggesting that they are immune from equitable exceptions.21 The 
nonjurisdictional exhaustion requirement imposed on a state prisoner seeking a 
federal writ of habeas corpus cannot be forfeited by the State or subject to 
estoppel.22 And federal courts may, in appropriate circumstances, raise a 
petitioner’s procedural default sua sponte to bar habeas corpus review under the 
nonjurisdictional independent and adequate state grounds doctrine, even if the 
state forfeited the argument.23 Courts may raise and decide many other 
nonjurisdictional limits sua sponte.24 And several commentators have picked 
up on the idea that nonjurisdictional rules can be mandatory or nonwaivable.25 
As these examples show, nonjurisdictional rules are not inherently 
prohibited from having jurisdictional effects. As a result, it is wrong to assume 
that jurisdictional rules have one set of fixed effects and nonjurisdictional rules 
have another. The dichotomy is simply false. 
B. The Effects of the False Dichotomy 
Adherence to the dichotomy has at least two consequences, both of which 
lead to analytically inconsistent results. First, it obscures a middle path that 
may be more accurate. For example, a rule might be nonjurisdictional yet 
exhibit jurisdictional traits. The false dichotomy does not allow for such a rule 
and therefore may lead to an incorrect result or doctrinal confusion. 
Second, judicial adherence to the false dichotomy risks either over- or 
underdeciding the case. Imagine, for example, a case that presents the question 
20. Cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 457 n.12 (2004) (noting the possibility that a 
debtor and creditor may not be able to stipulate to the assertion of time-barred claims when 
their assertion would prejudice other creditors); id. at 457 n.11 (noting a split in the lower 
courts as to whether equitable exceptions can excuse noncompliance with the deadline to 
object to a debtor’s discharge). 
21. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (characterizing Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 45(b) as “inflexible”). 
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (2000). 
23. Day, 547 U.S. at 206-07 (citing the unanimity of the circuits on this issue). 
24. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (res judicata defense); 
Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994) (retroactivity); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (failure to prosecute); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 
(1947) (forum non conveniens). 
25. See, e.g., Dane, supra note 19, at 39 (“First, legal rules can be mandatory without 
being jurisdictional.”); Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 1457, 1497 (2006) (“Courts can still apply nonjurisdictional rules with rigidity and 
decide, for example, that even if a particular rule is nonjurisdictional, it still cannot be 
waived.”). 
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of whether a rule is susceptible to equitable exceptions. A court that construes 
the rule as jurisdictional might resolve the question but only by overdeciding it: 
by characterizing the rule as jurisdictional, the court has silently resolved other 
questions not presented (and likely never briefed), such as whether the rule 
must be policed sua sponte by the court or whether the rule is subject to 
equitable exceptions. On the other hand, a court that construes the rule as 
nonjurisdictional but decides nothing further has underdecided the issue by 
merely begging the question of what jurisdictional attributes (such as being 
unsusceptible to equitable exceptions) the rule nonetheless might have. 
Take, as an example of these problems, the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Bowles v. Russell, about which I will have more to say later. There, 
Keith Bowles petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus, which the district 
court denied.26 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107, Bowles had thirty days to appeal.27 
He did not do so within that deadline. Instead, after the deadline had passed, 
Bowles moved to reopen the time to file an appeal,28 a motion authorized by 
§ 2107.29 The district court granted Bowles’s motion to reopen the time for 
appeal on February 10, 2004.30 
In the district court’s order, the district court gave Bowles seventeen days, 
until February 27, to file his notice of appeal. Accordingly, Bowles filed his 
notice of appeal on February 26.31 However, § 2107(c) limits a reopened time 
period to fourteen days.32 Thus, Bowles’s notice of appeal was timely under 
the district court’s order but untimely under § 2107(
The State successfully moved to dismiss Bowles’s appeal, arguing that the 
notice of appeal was untimely under § 2107(c) and that the Court of Appeals 
therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Bowles sought certiorari review 
in the Supreme Court, arguing that the deadline was not jurisdictional and that 
the Court should excuse his noncompliance with the statutory deadline because 
he relied on the district court’s order.33 
The Supreme Court agreed with the State and affirmed the decision of the 
lower court in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Thomas. Relying primarily on 
the statements of past cases, the Court held the rule to be jurisdictional.34 And, 
because the deadline was jurisdictional, it was not susceptible to the equitable 
excuse proffered by Bowles.35 
26. Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2362 (2007). 
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2000); see also FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). 
28. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362. 
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); see also FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6). 
30. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362. 
31. Id. 
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(6). 
33. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362-63. 
34. Id. at 2363 (“This Court has long held that the taking of an appeal within the 
prescribed time is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’”). 
35. Id. at 2366. 
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As I have argued elsewhere, there are a number of good reasons to criticize 
Bowles.36 One reason, however, is particularly relevant here. The issue in 
Bowles, in its narrowest sense, was whether the district court had the power to 
extend the time to file the notice of appeal beyond the time set by § 2107(c) for 
equitable reasons not recognized in the statute. But the issue the Court actually 
considered was whether the statutory time limit was jurisdictional. True, in 
answering “yes,” Bowles did resolve the narrower issue. But at the same time, 
the Court also resolved other issues sub silentio that, though neither presented 
by the facts nor addressed by the Court, necessarily follow from a jurisdictional 
characterization. Thus, by declaring the deadline jurisdictional, Bowles requires 
courts to police the deadline sua sponte, makes the deadline unsusceptible to 
waiver, forfeiture, or consent, and allows noncompliance to be raised at any 
time by any party—including the party who missed the deadline in the first 
place. Although none of these issues was presented by the parties in Bowles or, 
as far as I can tell, considered by the Court, the Court’s jurisdictional ruling 
decided them anyway. And, as I will explain below, a more principled 
consideration of them might have led to a different characterization. 
For what it is worth, the dissent in Bowles fell victim to the same trap. The 
dissent would have held the deadline nonjurisdictional and therefore amenable 
to the equitable excuse presented in the case.37 But a nonjurisdictional 
characterization, rather than leading to that result, merely begs it. Not all 
nonjurisdictional rules are amenable to equitable excuses, and there are good 
reasons why the deadline to file a notice of appeal is one of those that is not.38 
Thus, neither the majority nor the dissent confronted directly the narrow 
question presented, which was whether the deadline is mandatory (and 
therefore not subject to equitable exceptions). Worse, neither the majority nor 
the dissent even acknowledged the possibility of a middle path—that the rule 
might be nonjurisdictional yet unsusceptible to equitable exceptions. The 
Justices’ focus on the false dichotomy described above obscured that 
possibility. That is a shame, for, as I will argue below, a mandatory but 
nonjurisdictional characterization of § 2107 has much to commend it.39 
Bowles therefore illustrates the two perverse effects that the false 
dichotomy engenders. First, the dichotomy focused the Court’s inquiry on a 
question whose answer was either broader than necessary (the majority’s 
jurisdictional characterization) or narrower than needed (the dissent’s 
nonjurisdictional characterization) to resolve the case. And, second, it hid from 
the Court a critical piece of the puzzle: the possibility that a rule might be 
mandatory without being jurisdictional. 
36. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 42, 46 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/ 
2007/21/; Dodson, supra note 10, at 78 & n.126. 
37. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2367 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
38. See Dodson, supra note 36, at 46. 
39. See discussion infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2. 
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II.  A ROLE FOR MANDATORY RULES 
Had the Court in Bowles appreciated the nuances of jurisdictional and 
nonjurisdictional characterizations rather than focusing on the false dichotomy, 
it might have avoided the problems identified above.40 Convincing courts and 
commentators to look outside the dichotomy is thus a laudable goal. As a step 
toward that goal, I will show that the jurisdictional traits of nonjurisdictional 
rules can have valuable and important roles to play. Take, as just one example, 
the “mandatory rule.” 
A. Mandatory Rules Defined 
A mandatory rule is nonjurisdictional but nevertheless has the 
jurisdictional attribute of being unsusceptible to equitable excuses for 
noncompliance.41 Thus, a mandatory rule has the nonjurisdictional attributes of 
being waivable, forfeitable, and consentable, and a court has no obligation to 
monitor it sua sponte. However, if the rule is properly invoked by the party for 
whose benefit it lies, a court has no discretion to excuse noncompliance.42 
40. The Court has previously dispensed with a jurisdictional question in favor of a 
narrower ruling. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989) (declining to 
answer the question presented—whether the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s 
sixty-day notice provision was jurisdictional—and instead resolving the narrower question 
presented by the facts, namely whether the provision was amenable to equitable exceptions). 
41. See Dodson, supra note 36, at 46-47. Note that my definition is critically different 
than Justice Souter’s, who describes a mandatory rule as one that, while “enforceable at the 
insistence of a party claiming its benefit or by a judge concerned with moving the docket, it 
may be waived or mitigated in exercising reasonable equitable discretion.” Bowles, 127 S. 
Ct. at 2368 (Souter, J., dissenting). I take this to mean that Justice Souter believes a 
mandatory rule may be mitigated through the exercise of reasonable equitable discretion. I 
disagree with that definition. Allowing a “mandatory” rule to be subject to equitable 
discretion would render the “mandatory” moniker meaningless, for there would be nothing 
“mandatory” about it. 
42. I am of two minds as to whether a mandatory rule should generally allow or bar 
equitable estoppel. The principle of equitable estoppel is that where one party has, by his 
representations or conduct, induced the other party to give him an advantage that would be 
against equity and good conscience for him to assert, he should not be permitted to avail 
himself of that advantage in a court of justice. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 
231, 234 (1959). On the one hand, equitable estoppel could be viewed as a form of waiver—
one that is implied or forced based on the equitable doctrine that a party’s own behavior has 
deprived him of the right to benefit from the legal rule. See Dane, supra note 19, at 66-67. 
On the other hand, equitable estoppel is actually the opposite of waiver because it arises only 
when a party timely invokes the rule—it is only that equity deems the invocation ineffective. 
While generally I can see both arguments, specifically I believe, as I discuss in more depth 
below, that equitable estoppel should not be available in the context of state sovereign 
immunity. See infra text accompanying notes 182-190. 
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B. Institutional Benefits 
The benefits of such a rule in theory should be obvious. Waiver, consent, 
and forfeiture allow the parties to designate which issues require court decision 
and which are of such relative unimportance to the parties that they would 
rather forgo the costs of litigating them. They allow the parties to engage in 
minisettlements during the litigation, trading the invocation of a mandatory rule 
for a concession by the other side. They promote finality by ensuring that a 
relatively unimportant rule that is waived and quickly forgotten will not rise 
later on its own to unravel months’ or years’ worth of litigation and the settled 
expectations and choices of the parties. And, they reduce the unfairness of 
allowing the noncomplying party to raise her own default as a basis for 
overturning an adverse result. In sum, mandatory rules further efficiency and 
economy, encourage settlement, maintain finality, and promote fairness, all 
while preserving litigant autonomy and the adversarial process.43 
In addition, a mandatory but nonjurisdictional characterization relieves the 
court of the burden to police the rule sua sponte, an obligation that can impose 
significant costs on a court. Free of that duty, a court need not monitor when 
the rule’s requirement approaches and need not fret over whether the parties 
have complied when it arises. Instead, the court need only address the rule if 
the party for whose benefit it lies properly raises it, and the court can rely on 
the parties to brief the issue. Thus, mandatory rules further accuracy and 
conserve judicial resources by ensuring that the courts need only resolve the 
issue when the parties have raised and briefed it. 
Inflexibility—even in the face of equity—also has its virtues. Precluding 
equitable excuses incentivizes compliance, maintains finality and reliance 
interests, constrains judicial discretion and thus promotes fairness and equity 
across cases, furthers the rule of law, and conserves judicial resources by 
avoiding the need to litigate a host of potential equitable issues.44 The primary 
detraction is that the preclusion of equitable excuses might be harsh and unfair 
in specific cases. But, at least in theory, some situations call for a rule that 
elects inflexibility over equity. 
Neither a jurisdictional rule nor a nonjurisdictional, nonmandatory rule can 
boast of all of these benefits. That is not to say that a mandatory 
characterization is warranted in every situation. To the contrary, other 
situations may call for a jurisdictional rule, or perhaps for a nonjurisdictional 
rule that must be policed by the courts on their own. But my point is that we 
ought to break from the dichotomy to explore the various combinations 
available in the middle of the road that occupy beneficial niches. Mandatory 
43. Cf. Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 
399, 419 (1986) (discussing similar benefits). 
44. Cf. Dane, supra note 19, at 20-21 (“Strictly construed time limits create incentives 
for compliance. They encourage repose and advance finality. They reduce the burden on 
courts of deciding when leniency is in order.” (citation omitted)). 
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rules are just the particular species I have chosen to illustrate this idea. 
C. A Case Study: Section 2107 
Practicality, however, is necessary to validate theory. I therefore propose 
that a nonjurisdictional but mandatory characterization would have fit quite 
well with the statutory deadline for filing a notice of appeal that was at issue in 
Bowles. I will make both the nonjurisdictional case and the mandatory case for 
characterizing the deadline to file a notice of appeal in a civil case.45 
1. Nonjurisdictional  
Elsewhere I have developed a framework for determining whether a rule is 
jurisdictional or not in the removal context,46 and I think the analysis is 
generally importable to the context here. 
For such a statutory rule, a court first should consider whether Congress 
expressly designed the rule as jurisdictional. If so, then courts should presume 
the rule to be jurisdictional. After all, Congress is the branch with the 
constitutional authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the courts, and a clear 
statement of jurisdictionality should presumptively control.47 For § 2107, there 
is no clear statement of jurisdictionality. Congress directed that no notice of 
appeal “shall” be brought unless filed within thirty days,48 but nothing suggests 
that this word means “jurisdictional” as opposed to “mandatory.”49 Congress 
could have instead directed that “the appellate court shall have no jurisdiction 
unless a notice of appeal is filed within thirty days,” but it did not in fact speak 
in such jurisdictional terms. Thus, the presumption is inapplicable. 
Absent a presumption, a rule could still be jurisdictional, but the character 
will depend upon three other factors. First, what is the function or purpose of 
the rule? Is the rule directed primarily at the power of the court and underlying 
societal values such as federalism, or is it directed at the rights, obligations, or 
conveniences of the parties? Is it to separate classes of cases, or is it to provide 
a mode of procedure? Jurisdictional rules generally speak to the power of the 
court or underlying societal values and separate classes of cases. 
Nonjurisdictional rules, on the other hand, generally speak to the rights and 
45. Unlike a court, which should worry about the dangers of overdeciding or 
underdeciding the specific case before it, see supra text accompanying notes 36-38, I mean 
to characterize the statute fully and for a broader purpose. I do not mean to suggest that the 
Court should have followed my methodological approach wholesale in Bowles. 
46. Dodson, supra note 10, at 66-78. 
47. Id. at 66. 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2000). 
49. Cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (holding nonjurisdictional Bankruptcy 
Rule 4004(a), which prescribes that an objecting creditor “shall” file within sixty days). 
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obligations of the parties and regulate the process or mode of the case.50 
This factor supports a nonjurisdictional characterization of § 2107. The 
purpose of the time limit is to provide notice of the appeal and discourage 
litigation of stale issues. These primarily benefit the litigants rather than 
broader societal interests.51 This purpose is reinforced by the use of the phrase 
“is filed” in the rule: “no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree . . . 
unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days.”52 Though in the passive 
voice, the phrase “is filed” most sensibly speaks to the parties rather than to the 
appellate court. It is true that a notice of appeal shifts power from a district 
court to an appellate court,53 but that shift is caused by the very existence of a 
notice of appeal, not its timing. Also, while the deadline does separate appeals 
filed in less than thirty days from appeals filed in more than thirty days, those 
are not the kind of “classes of cases” that jurisdictional lines typically draw. 
Rather, the deadline appears more directed towards requiring litigant action 
than distinguishing between inherently different cases. In short, there is no 
reason to think that the timing of the notice of appeal (at least as opposed to its 
mere existence) has any jurisdictional function. 
Second, courts should consider the effects of a jurisdictional or 
nonjurisdictional characterization, including (1) the burdens on courts to 
monitor compliance sua sponte, (2) the benefits of allowing parties to consent 
to noncompliance, (3) the burden on the appellee to discover and prove 
noncompliance, and (4) the resulting inefficiencies and equities of a particular 
characterization.54 
This factor supports a nonjurisdictional characterization of § 2107 as well. 
The first and third effects basically cancel each other out. Dates are counted 
fairly easily, and any extension must be applied for by motion.55 Thus, the 
burden on the court to monitor compliance on its own is relatively light and is 
effectively the same as the burden on the appellee to discover and prove 
noncompliance. 
But the other effects more strongly point to a nonjurisdictional 
characterization. Allowing the appellee to be able to consent to an extension of 
the time to appeal permits the parties to choose to avoid litigating what 
constitutes “excusable neglect or good cause,”56 a determination that might 
otherwise be fact-intensive, time-consuming, and difficult for the court. 
50. Dodson, supra note 10, at 71-72. 
51. Hall, supra note 43, at 399-400 (“[A]ppeal periods are like original jurisdiction 
limitation periods: they involve primarily the interests of the immediate parties, not 
fundamental societal interests.”); Lees, supra note 25, at 1496. 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). 
53. See Lees, supra note 25, at 1496 (arguing that power shifts support a jurisdictional 
characterization). 
54. Dodson, supra note 10, at 77. 
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (conditioning extensions on the filing of a motion). 
56. Id. (allowing an extension “upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause”). 
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Similarly, a jurisdictional characterization for a timing defect that happens to 
go unnoticed may ultimately unravel a fully argued appeal, including even a 
rehearing and rehearing en banc, wasting litigant and judicial time and 
resources. On balance, the effects of the potential characterizations favor 
applying a nonjurisdictional characterization. 
Third, courts should consider doctrinal and cross-doctrinal consistency.57 
What characterization is most consistent with any historical treatment of the 
doctrine at issue or its equivalents? For § 2107, this factor either is neutral or 
supports a nonjurisdictional characterization. Although there is some language 
in prior precedent that terms the deadline as “mandatory and jurisdictional,”58 
that precedent is far from clear or consistent.59 In addition, the treatment of a 
time limit to appeal as jurisdictional is in tension with the long tradition of 
characterizing statutes of limitations as nonjurisdictional.60 
Taking all of these factors into consideration suggests that the time to file a 
notice of appeal in a civil case under § 2107 is nonjurisdictional. But, as I have 
argued, that a rule is nonjurisdictional does not make it nonmandatory. 
2. Mandatory  
There are good reasons for characterizing the deadline to file a civil notice 
of appeal as mandatory (and therefore not amenable to equitable exceptions) 
even if it is nonjurisdictional. First, Congress wrote that “no appeal shall [be 
brought] . . . unless notice of appeal is [timely] filed.”61 The word “shall,” 
though not dispositive as to a jurisdictional characterization, normally does 
create a mandatory obligation.62 
Second, Congress expressly provided specific and detailed exceptions—
excusable neglect or good cause—and strict time limits both for raising them 
and for extending the time to appeal once an exception is met.63 Its deliberate 
choices suggest that lawmakers meant to restrain judicial discretion from going 
57. Dodson, supra note 10, at 78. 
58. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2363 (2007). 
59. See Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. 631, 635-
43 (2008). 
60. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (characterizing statutes of limitations as waivable 
affirmative defenses); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006); Irwin v. Dep’t of 
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 93-96 (1990); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 
385, 394 (1982); Lees, supra note 25, at 1491-98 (linking statutes of limitations to appeal 
deadlines as support for a nonjurisdictional characterization of each). 
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). 
62. See, e.g., Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 
35 (1998) (stating that “the mandatory ‘shall[]’ . . . normally creates an obligation 
impervious to judicial discretion”). But cf. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 
433 n.9 (1995) (“Though ‘shall’ generally means ‘must,’ legal writers sometimes use, or 
misuse, ‘shall’ to mean ‘should,’ ‘will,’ or even ‘may.’”). 
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). 
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beyond the parameters that Congress set forth.64 
Third, cases interpreting time limits for filing notices of appeal almost 
uniformly have held them to be mandatory.65 As I noted above, one should 
question whether certain cases properly characterized the time limit to be 
jurisdictional,66 but they are on far firmer ground characterizing it as 
mandatory.67 And, the Court also has characterized as mandatory the time limit 
for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case.68 Thus, a mandatory 
characterization would be fully consistent with prior decisions.69 
The balance of equities is a tougher call, for unique circumstances may 
raise compelling arguments for the application of equity.70 But, in my view, 
those rare inequities are outweighed by the other justifications for a mandatory 
characterization. The deadline serves the important purposes of discouraging 
old and stale appeals and of promoting finality and reliance interests by setting 
a definite point of time when litigation shall be at an end.71 The resulting 
salutary effects of characterizing the rule as mandatory—finality, predictability, 
efficiency, and the rule of law—at least mitigate the harsh effects of particular 
sympathetic situations. And they make it particularly unlikely that a mitigated 
need for equity can outweigh the textual and precedential support for a 
mandatory characterization noted above. 
One practical difficulty of making the time to appeal forfeitable is that no 
64. See, e.g., United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1998) (“Equitable tolling 
is not permissible where it is inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute. Here, the 
QTA, by providing that the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff 
‘knew or should have known of the claim of the United States,’ has already effectively 
allowed for equitable tolling. Given this fact, and the unusually generous nature of the 
QTA’s limitations time period, extension of the statutory period by additional equitable 
tolling would be unwarranted.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 
347, 352 (1997) (“Section 6511’s detail, its technical language, the iteration of the 
limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions, 
taken together, indicate to us that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, 
open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.”); Bank of Ala. v. Dalton, 
50 U.S. 522 (1850) (interpreting a statute of limitations that includes specified exceptions to 
exclude others). 
65. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2364-65 (2007) (citing precedent). 
66. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
67. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
68. See United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224-26 (1960) (characterizing a time 
limit in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for filing a notice of appeal as “mandatory 
and jurisdictional,” and holding the limit not subject to extension for reasons of excusable 
neglect). 
69. Considerations of stare decisis have special force in statutory interpretation cases 
because Congress can alter the Court’s interpretations. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 
U.S. 689, 700 (1992); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989). 
70. Keith Bowles’s own reliance on an erroneous district court order is particularly 
sympathetic. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nonjurisdictionality or Inequity, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 64 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/24/. 
71. See Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978). 
DODSON 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 10/13/2008 4:25 PM 
October 2008] MANDATORY RULES 15 
 
specific pleading mechanism sets a clear line for when a challenge to a tardy 
appeal has been forfeited.72 An easy solution, however, is to recognize a forfeit 
from the failure to raise the defect in the initial opposition brief. 
On balance, then, the deadline to file a notice of appeal is mandatory but 
nonjurisdictional.73 
3. Some conclusions  
As I mentioned above, Bowles should not have undertaken so elaborate an 
inquiry. If the deadline to file a notice of appeal is in fact mandatory, then the 
Court could have resolved the case by saying just that without ever tackling the 
broader question of whether the rule is also jurisdictional. My purposes here are 
quite different; I mean to show that there are good reasons to characterize 
§ 2107 as a mandatory but nonjurisdictional rule and that such a 
characterization has the potential for positive practical value. 
III. MANDATORY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The previous Parts demonstrated that mandatory but nonjurisdictional rules 
have a valuable role to play and that courts should apply them with greater 
appreciation. But they did so in the context of cases already decided. To truly 
demonstrate the value of a wide appreciation, I want to show how they might 
resolve an undecided and very different question: how to characterize state 
sovereign immunity. 
That is a daunting task, for while the characterization approach of § 2107 
was a somewhat ordinary case of statutory interpretation, state sovereign 
immunity is not statutory and thus lacks the familiar grounding that statutes can 
provide. But, though daunting, the task is necessary. Not all rules are statutory. 
Some are court rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act, some are 
prudential rules prescribed by the courts themselves, some are common law 
rules, and some are constitutional or quasi-constitutional rules. A broader case 
for a greater appreciation for the mandatory rule would be one in which a 
governing text cannot be relied upon. 
Enter the Eleventh Amendment, or, rather, to be more accurate under the 
prevailing case law, state sovereign immunity. Simply stated, sovereign 
immunity is the prerogative of a nonconsenting sovereign not to be sued.74 Is 
72. Hall, supra note 43, at 425. 
73. Other commentators have agreed, though under a more cursory analysis. See, e.g., 
id. at 424. 
74. I have oversimplified here for convenience. In reality, state sovereign immunity is 
more convoluted; for example, it encompasses immunity from suits brought by private 
individuals and foreign nations but not suits brought by other states or the federal 
government. Compare Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (applying 
immunity to suits by foreign nations), and Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (applying 
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this rule jurisdictional? If not, is it nevertheless mandatory? 
A. A Brief Background on State Sovereign Immunity 
The historical acceptance of some form of sovereign immunity is ancient 
and widespread.75 Its rationale is logical from a monarchical view. The King 
could not be compelled by his own laws against his will, for, as the absolute 
font of the law, his refusal to submit would create a legal exception for 
himself.76 Likewise, the King could not be compelled by his own courts 
regardless of the source of the law, for the King, as the highest figure of justice, 
would then be inferior to his own tribunals.77 
At Independence, the new American states inherited the doctrine from 
England,78 but, as with other traditions, the colonists’ new notions of 
sovereignty did not fit well with the traditional model,79 for two reasons. First, 
the revolutionaries rejected the absolute sovereignty of the King80 and placed 
immunity to suits brought by private individuals), with United States v. Mississippi, 380 
U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965) (refusing to apply immunity to suits brought by the United States), 
and South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315 (1904) (refusing to apply immunity 
to suits brought by a state), and United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892) (same as 
United States v. Mississippi). 
75. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 5 
(1972) (“At least as early as the thirteenth century, during the reign of Henry III (1216-
1272), it was recognized that the king could not be sued in his own courts . . . .”); Louis L. 
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1963) (“By the time of Bracton (1268) it was settled doctrine that the King could not be 
sued eo nominee in his own courts.”); see also Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 
529 (1857) (“It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the 
sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and 
permission . . . .”). 
76. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *243-51; see also Kawananakoa v. 
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (“A sovereign is exempt from suit, not 
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground 
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right 
depends.”). But see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 97-98 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing this logic). 
77. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *242 (“[N]o suit or action can be brought 
against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For 
all jurisdiction implies superiority of power . . . .”); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 103 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he King or Crown, as the font of justice, is not subject to suit in 
its own courts.”); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1979) (explaining sovereign 
immunity on the basis that no tribunal could be higher than the King). 
78. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882) (surmising that the doctrine “is 
derived from the laws and practice of our English ancestors”). 
79. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document 
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 115 (2000) (explaining that the Framers broke with 
English tradition in a variety of ways, including English understanding of sovereignty). 
80. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 n.24 (1997) (“Although we have adopted 
the related doctrine of sovereign immunity, the common law fiction that [the King can do no 
wrong] was rejected at the birth of the Republic.”). 
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that sovereign authority in the people themselves.81 And, second, the new 
government was federal, with both state and national governments, and with 
the national government supreme over the states in certain matters.82 
Nevertheless, both the ratification debates and the adoption of the Eleventh 
Amendment confirm that the tradition was accepted in some form. The 
ratification debates were particularly incendiary. The original Constitution 
contained no mention of sovereign immunity, and leading opponents of 
ratification argued that the Constitution would abrogate that sovereign 
prerogative.83 
But prominent supporters of ratification assured the people that the states 
would retain their prerogative not to be sued without their consent. Alexander 
Hamilton wrote: “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable 
to the suit of an individual without its consent.”84 And James Madison asserted, 
“It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.”85 Even John 
Marshall, before becoming Chief Justice, stated, “I hope that no gentleman will 
think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court . . . . It is not 
rational to suppose that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a court.”86 
And, when the Supreme Court held in Chisholm v. Georgia,87 shortly after 
ratification, that the Constitution abrogated that prerogative,88 the states reacted 
81. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); THE FEDERALIST NO. 
22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the people are 
“that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority”); id. NO. 46, at 294 (James Madison) 
(“The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the 
people . . . . [T]he ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the 
people alone . . . .”); id. NO. 49, at 313 (James Madison) (“[T]he people are the only 
legitimate fountain of power . . . .”); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 802 (1999) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that royal dignity is “inimical to the republican conception, 
which rests on the understanding of its citizens precisely that the government is not above 
the them, but of them, its actions being governed by law just like their own”); GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 344-62, 404-10, 447-54, 
463-65 (1969) (explaining that the revolutionaries and, later, the Federalists, located 
sovereignty in the people rather than in the government). 
82. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
83. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 429-31 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) 
(Brutus) (interpreting Article III to “subject[] a state to answer in a court of law, to the suit of 
an individual”); 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 526-27 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1876) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES] (George Mason) (arguing that Article III enables “claim[s] against this state [to] 
be tried before the federal court”); 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 41-42 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) (Federal 
Farmer) (“[T]his new jurisdiction will subject the states . . . to actions, and processes . . . .”). 
For a list of similar ratification sentiments, see Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State 
Sovereign Immunity, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 721, 728 n.33 (2002). 
84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton). 
85. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 533 (James Madison). 
86. Id. at 555 (John Marshall). 
87. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
88. Id. 
DODSON 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 10/13/2008 4:25 PM 
18 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1 
 
quickly to overturn the decision by constitutional amendment. An amendment 
was proposed the day after Chisholm was issued.89 During the ensuing 
congressional recess, Massachusetts and Virginia called for a constitutional 
convention to consider the suability of states in federal court.90 Within a few 
months, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and North Carolina all had joined in the 
push for a convention.91 Almost immediately after Congress reconvened, the 
Senate introduced what was to become the Eleventh Amendment.92 It passed 
23-2 in the Senate93 and 81-9 in the House.94 
The ratification debates and the swift and decisive overturning of Chisholm 
provide powerful historical justifications for the recognition of state sovereign 
immunity as an accepted part of American federalism. And, despite the 
tensions between the doctrine’s foundations and a federal democratic 
republic,95 that acceptance has happened.96 The open question is whether the 
doctrine is jurisdictional or not, and, if not, whether the doctrine is mandatory. 
B. The Case for a Nonjurisdictional State Sovereign Immunity 
To make the case for a nonjurisdictional sovereign immunity, I rely on the 
two-step framework used to characterize § 2107 above that begins with 
consideration of a presumption of jurisdictionality and continues with three 
additional factors.97 Application of the framework provides much support for a 
nonjurisdictional characterization of state sovereign immunity.98 
89. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 101 (rev. 
ed. 1937) (“[N]o State shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the Judicial 
Courts established or to be established under the authority of the United States, at the suit of 
any person or persons, citizens or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate whether 
within or without the United States.”). 
90. See 1793 Va. Acts 52; John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State 
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1931 (1983). 
91. See JACOBS, supra note 75, at 65-66. 
92. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 25 (1794). 
93. Id. at 30-31. 
94. 4 id. at 476-78. 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82. 
96. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882) (“And while the exemption of 
the United States and of the several states from being subjected as defendants to ordinary 
actions in the courts has since that time been repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never 
been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established 
doctrine.”). 
97. See supra Part II.C.1. 
98. I sympathize with the view that sovereign immunity has aspects of personal 
jurisdiction, see Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 1559 (2002), and many of the arguments I make here might also support 
such a characterization. I have not yet resolved how personal jurisdiction fits into the 
jurisdictional characterization inquiry, and so, as I mentioned at the outset, see supra note 
15, I have proceeded on the definition of “jurisdiction” as subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, 
that personal jurisdiction may appropriately characterize the doctrine of state sovereign 
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1. Presumption of jurisdictionality  
The first step is whether a clear statement of jurisdictionality from a 
lawmaking authority raises a presumption of jurisdictionality.99 Sovereign 
immunity inheres in the very status of sovereignty,100 and thus textual 
manifestations, except in the cases of abrogation or waiver,101 are rare. As a 
result, there are few instances to apply the presumption. 
The glaring exception is the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
which states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State.”102 
Were I analyzing only the Eleventh Amendment, I might conclude that the 
presumption of jurisdictionality applies here. After all, its language, which 
speaks directly to the court and restricts its “power,” strongly implies a 
limitation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
But there are two reasons why that implication should be set aside here. 
First, the Supreme Court has distanced itself from the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment. In the Court’s view, the Eleventh Amendment is merely a 
confirmation of the older principle of state sovereign immunity.103 The words 
of the Eleventh Amendment were meant only to overturn Chisholm.104 In 
effect, Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment cancel each other out, restoring 
a textless doctrine of sovereign immunity.105 The Court has not been shy about 
adopting this view with respect to other terms of the Eleventh Amendment,106 
and so there is good reason to question rote adherence to the textual limitation 
on “Judicial power.”107 As the Court has said, “[t]his separate and distinct 
immunity does not mean that “mandatory but nonjurisdictional,” as I have explained it, does 
not as well. 
99. Dodson, supra note 10, at 66-67. 
100. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is 
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without 
its consent.”). 
101. Congress may abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states by statute in certain 
cases, see, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (allowing abrogation 
under the Bankruptcy Clause); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (allowing 
abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment), and states themselves may waive their 
immunity by state statute, see, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) (stating that 
many state statutes waive sovereign immunity for certain cases). 
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
103. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). 
104. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
105. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 722-23. 
106. See Scott Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 393, 394 n.6 
(2003) (citing cases). 
107. I alluded to this in an earlier article. See Scott Dodson, Dignity: The New Frontier 
of State Sovereignty, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 777, 821 (2003) (“Perhaps the best resolution lies in 
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structural principle [of state sovereign immunity] is not directly related to the 
scope of the judicial power established by Article III.”108 
And, second, even if the Eleventh Amendment does erect a jurisdictional 
bar for the immunity encompassed within its text, not all sovereign immunity is 
captured by the Eleventh Amendment. There is broad agreement that states 
have some kind of sovereign immunity from suits that do not fall within the 
literal terms of the Eleventh Amendment.109 Thus, most instances of sovereign 
immunity are not based on the Eleventh Amendment at all and therefore have 
little connection to its text. 
These reasons counsel in favor of declining to apply the presumption and 
instead considering the characterization of the doctrine through the other 
factors. 
2. Function  
The first of those factors is the function of the doctrine. On the whole, this 
factor supports a nonjurisdictional characterization. 
The primary function of state sovereign immunity—granting a state the 
right not to be subject to a lawsuit at the insistence of an individual—speaks to 
a right of a particular party, not to a limitation on the court’s power to hear the 
case. And, a state can waive sovereign immunity or consent to suit,110 features 
that also support a nonjurisdictional function. 
Confessedly, immunity is not clearly either a “mode of relief” or a “claim-
processing rule,” as many nonjurisdictional rules of procedure are, but neither 
does sovereign immunity really “separate classes of cases” as rules of subject-
matter jurisdiction generally do.111 The inability of sovereign immunity to fit 
perfectly into one of those categories just means that that dichotomy is less 
helpful to the characterization; it does not mean that the characterization cannot 
rethinking the characterization of state sovereign immunity as a limitation on judicial power. 
If it is indeed so completely divorced from the text of the Constitution as the Court has 
intimated, it need not be bound by the Eleventh Amendment’s reference to a limit on ‘the 
judicial Power,’ . . . .”). 
108. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730. 
109. See Nelson, supra note 98 (distinguishing between Eleventh Amendment 
immunity as subject-matter jurisdiction and non-Eleventh Amendment immunity as personal 
jurisdiction); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 736 (“[T]he . . . text of the Amendment is not an 
exhaustive description of the States’ constitutional immunity from suit.”); Seminole Tribe of 
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116-17 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing a 
nonconstitutional immunity outside of the Eleventh Amendment).  
110. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1887); see also Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002) (holding that a state’s voluntary removal to 
federal court waives Eleventh Amendment immunity); Idaho v. Couer d’Alene Tribe of 
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (“[A] State can waive its Eleventh Amendment protection 
and allow a federal court to hear and decide a case commenced or prosecuted against it.”). 
111. See Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413-14 (2004) (setting out these 
categories); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454-55 (2004) (same). 
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be made on the basis of other considerations.112 Sovereign immunity is 
directed at the right of a particular party, rather than the power of the court, and 
on that basis, I am comfortable concluding that its function supports a 
nonjurisdictional c
There are contraindications, though they are weak. First, the logical 
justification for sovereign immunity as applied in eighteenth-century England, 
particularly the idea that the courts could not have jurisdiction over the King 
because jurisdiction implies superiority in power,113 does support a 
jurisdictional characterization. But the logical justification was rejected by the 
new American republic and has never been a justification for the doctrine in the 
United States.114 In addition, the Constitution expressly contemplates federal 
jurisdiction over state defendants in certain cases,115 and the Supreme Court 
uniformly has upheld such exercise of jurisdiction.116 
Second, the text of the Eleventh Amendment—“The Judicial power shall 
not extend”117—seems to speak to the power of the court rather than the rights 
or obligations of the sovereign party. That also supports a jurisdictional 
characterization. But, as I mentioned above, there are good reasons to set the 
text of the Eleventh Amendment aside when discussing state sovereign 
immunity.118 And even were the Eleventh Amendment’s text to apply, it would 
leave untouched a broad swath of cases in which non-Eleventh Amendment 
state sovereign immunity could apply and in which the characterization of that 
non-Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity must still be determined. 
Third, immunity in federal court functions as a defense to the entire suit 
rather than merely a defense to liability or certain relief.119 In that respect, state 
sovereign immunity is unlike Scarborough v. Principi,120 which characterized 
as nonjurisdictional a rule pertaining to a particular “mode of relief” in a case 
over which the court already had jurisdiction.121 But not all exemptions from 
112. See Dodson, supra note 10, at 71-77. (“To the extent that a particular issue that 
arises is just too difficult to characterize as a claim-processing rule or one that separates 
classes of cases, then this factor in the framework may be less helpful than the other factors, 
but that does not mean that the framework as a whole cannot be effective.”). 
113. See supra note 77. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82. Of course, the dignity rationale also is 
of questionable pedigree, see Dodson, supra note 107, at 780-808, but it does have the 
additional force of express Supreme Court endorsement. 
115. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending jurisdiction to suits between states). 
116. See, e.g., South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315 (1904) (refusing to 
allow immunity from suit brought against a state by a state). 
117. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 103-09. 
119. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (calling the 
doctrine “a sovereign immunity from suit”); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & 
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (stating that immunity is justified “in part by a concern 
that States not be unduly burdened by litigation”). 
120. 541 U.S. 401 (2004). 
121. Id. at 413. 
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suit are limitations on a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.122 Other doctrines, 
such as official immunity, are nonjurisdictional immunities from suit.123 The 
mere fact that the immunity is a bar to suit rather than to a remedy says little 
about whether it is jurisdictional. 
Fourth, state sovereign immunity does function to protect federalism 
divisions, an institutional value that often calls for a jurisdictional 
characterization in litigation between private parties. The reason institutional 
protections such as federalism values often warrant a jurisdictional 
characterization is that the private parties may not have adequate incentives to 
protect them.124 
In the case of state sovereign immunity, however, the federalism angle cuts 
the other way. The primary purpose of immunity is “to accord States the 
dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”125 In contrast 
to a private individual, a party-state has a vested interest in protecting its own 
dignity, and therefore the state’s ability to make choices that implicate 
immunity stands on a very different footing than a private party’s ability to 
make the same choices. In addition, the ability of the state to make such choices 
is a vindication of, rather than an impingement on, the dignity of the state.126 
The same cannot be said when the choice is made by a private party. 
It is possible that state sovereign immunity implicates other institutional 
values besides respect for state dignity, but it is difficult to discern exactly what 
122. See Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 267 (calling the doctrine “a sovereign immunity 
from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the Federal Judiciary’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction”). 
123. Cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514-15 (2006) (holding the employer-
numerosity requirement of Title VII to be nonjurisdictional, even though an employer not 
meeting the requirement would not be covered by the statute at all). Compare Saucier v. 
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (stating that official immunity “is an immunity from suit 
rather than a mere defense to liability”) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted), 
with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (stating that official immunity is an 
affirmative defense that must be pleaded). 
124. See Dane, supra note 19, at 36-37 (“Commentators sometimes say that parties 
cannot control jurisdictional issues because jurisdictional rules embody societal interests that 
go beyond the interests of the parties and that none of the parties might have an adequate 
incentive to advance. For example, both parties to a lawsuit might prefer their case to be 
heard in a fast, efficient, clean federal court than in a slow, clumsy, dingy state court. But the 
larger social interest in federalism might dictate otherwise.”); Hall, supra note 43, at 423 
(referencing “important political principles that underlie the jurisdictional limits in a federal 
system”). 
125. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002). A 
secondary purpose is to protect the state fisc. See id. at 765 (“While state sovereign 
immunity serves the important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving the 
States’ ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens, the doctrine’s central 
purpose is to accord the States the respect owed them as joint sovereigns.” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 769 (“As we have previously noted, however, the 
primary function of sovereign immunity is not to protect State treasuries, but to afford the 
States the dignity and respect due sovereign entities.” (citation omitted)). 
126. See Dodson, supra note 107, at 820-23. 
DODSON 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 10/13/2008 4:25 PM 
October 2008] MANDATORY RULES 23 
ed.  
 
they would be127 and to understand why the states would not adequately 
protect them as parties anyway. In any case, the primary purpose of protecting 
state dignity should take precedence over whatever secondary federalism 
effects happen to be implicat 128
Thus, the primary function of state sovereign immunity—to provide a 
particular state party a right to refuse to be a defendant—bespeaks a 
nonjurisdictional rule rather than a jurisdictional rule. There are some 
counterindications, but they are outweighed by (or, as to the purpose of 
protecting state dignity, actually support) the stronger nonjurisdictional 
functions. On balance, this factor supports a nonjurisdictional characterization. 
3. Effects  
The effects factor also supports a nonjurisdictional characterization. A 
nonjurisdictional characterization would entail significant benefits of consent 
and waiver with a relatively low impact on institutional federalism values. On 
the flip side, a jurisdictional characterization has only marginal benefits and 
burdens. 
The ability of a state to waive immunity or consent to suit is an important 
nonjurisdictional feature. The state legislature may wish to waive immunity in 
an entire class of cases, such as discrimination cases. Or, the state may wish to 
consent to a particular lawsuit from which it would otherwise be immune. 
Public pressure or individualized considerations of fairness and justice may 
motivate a state’s decision to waive or consent. On the other hand, equally 
important concerns for the state fisc might justify a decision not to waive 
immunity or consent to suit.129 In short, the nonjurisdictional characteristics of 
waiver and consent provide an opportunity for the states to strike a balance 
between the legitimate concerns of suing a state and the need for redress of 
injuries caused by the state. The importance of the ability to waive immunity or 
consent to suit supports a nonjurisdictional characterization. 
The downside is comparatively insubstantial. A federal court’s issuance of 
127. See id. at 807 (questioning the federalism benefits of the dignity rationale); 
Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic 
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61 (1998) (“[T]he Court appears to be much more 
concerned about preserving the dignity of the states—as if they were natural persons that 
could experience hurt feelings beyond those of their residents—than in pursuing 
decentralization and the other policy goals that federalism serves.” (citations omitted)); 
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-26 (1994). See generally Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 
24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002) (analyzing the impact of state sovereignty on federalism 
values). 
128. Dodson, supra note 10, at 59-61. 
129. See Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New 
Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 266 (2000) (noting that a state cannot simply declare 
bankruptcy or limit spending only to profitable matters). 
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a binding order on a sovereign state does implicate federalism concerns. But, 
under the immunity doctrine, the federal court’s ability to do so is blessed by 
the state itself through waiver or consent. It is therefore difficult to understand 
why the effects on federalism are unduly severe. Self-interest would suggest 
that a state would only subject itself to suit when federalism implications are 
minor or significantly outweighed by other needs. In addition, to the extent 
federalism values are supported by maintaining the dignity of the state,130 it is 
surely more consonant with state dignity to allow a state to waive immunity or 
consent to suit than to disallow the state to do so when it so wishes.131 Finally, 
by creating a market for its consent or waiver, the state can maximize its 
economic rewards, and the Supreme Court has upheld the propriety of a state 
“selling” its waiver to the federal government for federal funds.132 The upshot 
to all this is that a nonjurisdictional characterization has significant benefits 
because it allows the possibility of waiver and consent. 
A jurisdictional characterization, on the other hand, might cause some 
marginal costs and unfairness. For example, an entity whose state status is 
unclear might wait until losing on the merits before asserting its sovereign 
immunity.133 At that point, the district court or appellate court would have to 
determine whether the entity is an arm of the state entitled to immunity after a 
judgment on the merits. Raising a jurisdictional issue late in the case, after a 
merits determination, flips the natural order of the proceedings and may cause 
an unraveling of the entire case, resulting in wasted judicial and litigant 
resources and uncertainty at the outset. 
It seems unlikely, however, that a state entity would hide the ball in that 
way very often. Immunity would preclude the suit altogether, and any denial of 
immunity would be immediately appealable.134 Therefore, if the entity has any 
basis to claim state status, it has little to gain by asserting immunity only late in 
the proceedings.135 It is, therefore, unlikely that a jurisdictional 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 125-28. 
131. See Dodson, supra note 107, at 820-23. 
132. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (stating that Congress may induce 
immunity waivers through Spending Clause legislation). 
133. See Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State 
Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 290-91 (2002) 
(arguing that, as a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction, states may assert sovereign immunity 
for the first time even on a collateral attack to the judgment). 
134. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993). 
135. Two cases illustrate the likely rarity of such delay. In Northern Insurance Co. of 
New York v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189 (2006), the plaintiff insurance company sued a 
Georgia county for negligent operation of a drawbridge. The county immediately moved for 
summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds, even though it was not an arm of the 
state. Id. at 192. The county’s conduct demonstrates the willingness of quasi-state entities to 
claim immunity even if their justifications for the claim are doubtful. The other case, 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), may be the exception that proves the rule. There, 
the plaintiff sued a state officer for declaratory and injunctive relief. It was not until the 
plaintiff prevailed and the court issued an order against the state officer that the state officer 
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characterization would waste m
However, the benefits of a jurisdictional characterization are not 
appreciable, either. It is true that a jurisdictional characterization would save 
courts from delving into questions of equity or waiver, but it does not appear 
that those issues are often contested or difficult to resolve.136 On balance, the 
jurisdictional costs probably negate the jurisdictional benefits. In light of the 
neutral effect of a jurisdictional characterization, the significant benefits of the 
availability of waiver and consent tip this factor in favor of a nonjurisdictional 
characterization. 
4. Doctrinal and cross-doctrinal consistency 
The last factor, doctrinal and cross-doctrinal consistency, also supports a 
nonjurisdictional characterization. Although the Supreme Court has never 
categorically characterized state sovereign immunity as jurisdictional or 
not137—though it has come close in conflicting pronouncements138—a 
jurisdictional characterization would undermine the longstanding tradition of 
allowing the state to consent to suit139 or otherwise waive its immunity.140 
Even in its English roots, the sovereign could waive sovereign immunity,141 
appealed and asserted sovereign immunity from part of the judgment. Id. at 677-78. The 
Court allowed the assertion of immunity for the first time on appeal. Id. However, there was 
good reason to do so. The suit ostensibly was permitted by Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908), at the outset; it was not until the district court ordered retroactive monetary payments 
that the state officer asserted immunity from such payments as not covered by the Young 
exception. Indeed, the Supreme Court reversed only that part of the order. Edelman, 415 
U.S. at 678. Had the state officer understood that retroactive payments were sought, it is 
likely he would have asserted the immunity defense at the outset as well. 
136. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002) 
(adopting general waiver principles as a basis for a federal common law of sovereign 
immunity waiver); id. at 623-24 (disagreeing that the waiver rule adopted is confusing or 
unclear). 
137. See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 391-92 (1998) (“Even making 
the assumption that Eleventh Amendment immunity is a matter of subject-matter 
jurisdiction—a question we have not decided . . . .”). 
138. Compare Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) 
(calling it “a sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the federal 
judiciary’s subject-matter jurisdiction”), with Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677-78 (stating that state 
sovereign immunity “sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need 
not be raised in the trial court”). 
139. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (“Many States, on their own 
initiative, have enacted statutes consenting to a wide variety of suits.”); Great N. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944) (proclaiming that immunity is “mitigated by a sense of 
justice which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the sovereign”). 
140. See Lapides, 535 U.S. at 616 (holding that a state’s removal to federal court 
constituted waiver); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (“The immunity from suit 
belonging to a state . . . is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure . . . .”). 
141. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *243 (“If any person has, in point of 
property, a just demand upon the King, he must petition him in his court of chancery, where 
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and the several states’ ability to waive sovereign immunity has always been 
recognized in America.142 The availability of waiver, which ordinarily is not 
allowed for rules that limit subject-matter jurisdiction,143 is more consistent 
with a nonjurisdictional characterization of state sovereign immunity than a 
jurisdictional characterization.144 
In addition, the Court’s development of the sovereign immunity doctrine 
has three other features that are in tension with a jurisdictional characterization 
of the doctrine. First, courts need not police and raise state sovereign immunity 
sua sponte,145 unlike most jurisdictional defects.146 Second, immunity does not 
apply when the suit is against a state officer alleged to have violated federal 
law, so long as the suit is for prospective, injunctive relief only.147 This 
exception is in tension with a strict jurisdictional bar. Third, the availability of 
immunity depends upon the status of the plaintiff. For example, if the plaintiff 
is a sister state or the United States, there is no state sovereign immunity from 
suit.148 For these reasons, doctrinal consistency supports a nonjurisdictional 
characterization. 
As for cross-doctrinal consistency, there are several potential analogues to 
other doctrines,149 but the closest is federal sovereign immunity. Federal 
sovereign immunity is, at least according to the Court, jurisdictional. In United 
States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,150 the United States filed a claim on 
his chancellor will administer right, as a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion.”); see 
also Banker’s Case, 14 Howell’s State Trials 1 (1700); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 
419, 460 (1793) (Wilson, J.) (restating the English practice). 
142. See supra note 140. 
143. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 n.21 (1978); 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975); Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 148, 149 
(1834). 
144. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 127-28 (1996) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
145. See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
146. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (stating that 
courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction 
exists, even if not challenged by any party). 
147. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (establishing the exception); 
see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (limiting 
Young to violations of federal law); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974) (limiting 
Young to prospective, nonmonetary relief). 
148. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315 (1904) (refusing to allow 
immunity from suit brought against a state by a state); see also United States v. Mississippi, 
380 U.S. 128 (1965) (refusing to allow immunity from suit brought against a state by the 
United States); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (same). 
149. Official immunity for police officers and other state officials acting in the scope 
and discretion of official duties, a possible analogue, is nonjurisdictional. See Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). 
150. 309 U.S. 506 (1940). 
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behalf of Indian tribes for unpaid royalties due on mining leases against a coal 
mining company, a debtor in a bankruptcy reorganization. The coal mining 
company counterclaimed, seeking an amount that exceeded the United States’ 
claim.151 Federal sovereign immunity law allows counterclaims as “set-offs” 
against an original claim by the United States but bars any excess that would 
amount to a monetary award against the United States.152 The United States 
failed to assert immunity against the counterclaim, however, and the 
bankruptcy court approved both claims, leaving the United States with a 
negative recovery against the coal mining company.153 Subsequently, the 
United States brought the same suit against the mining company’s surety, and 
the surety moved to dismiss based on res judicata.154 The Supreme Court 
disagreed, holding the bankruptcy judgment void for lack of jurisdiction.155 
Thus, a court lacks jurisdiction over a claim against the United States even if 
the United States never asserts immunity in that case. The jurisdictional status 
of federal sovereign immunity was recently confirmed in United States v. 
Mitchell.156 
The jurisdictional character of federal sovereign immunity provides some 
support for a jurisdictional characterization of the analogous state sovereign 
immunity. Were the other factors less indicative of a contrary characterization, 
the cross-doctrinal support of federal sovereign immunity might tip the scales. 
But, here, the character of federal sovereign immunity must be weighed against 
the function and characterization effects of state sovereign immunity, which 
point towards a nonjurisdictional characterization. 
In addition, important differences between federal sovereign immunity and 
state sovereign immunity weaken the analogical support. Unlike the states, the 
federal government did not surrender any immunity at ratification. Also unlike 
the states, the federal government occupies a role in our federal system more 
amenable to traditional sovereign immunity. It is more consonant with the role 
of the federal government to assert traditionally jurisdictional immunity than 
for the states.157 
151. Id. at 512-15. 
152. See GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT §§ 8.12-.13 
(4th ed. 2006). 
153. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 309 U.S. at 513-15. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“[T]he existence of consent [or waiver] is a 
prerequisite for jurisdiction.”). 
157. The Court has recognized that differences between federal sovereign immunity 
and state sovereign immunity may justify their differential doctrinal development. See, e.g., 
Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 542-43 (2002) (declining to construe 
state sovereign immunity doctrine consistently with federal sovereign immunity doctrine on 
an issue of limitations). But see Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999) (calling federal sovereign immunity “obviously the 
closest analogy” to state sovereign immunity in the waiver context). 
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On balance, then, while there are good reasons to seek consistency between 
federal sovereign immunity law and state sovereign immunity law,158 the other 
factors supporting a nonjurisdictional characterization of state sovereign 
immunity likely outweigh the importance of cross-doctrinal consistency. 
C. The Case for a Mandatory Sovereign Immunity 
The case for characterizing state sovereign immunity as nonjurisdictional is 
only part of the inquiry. A nonjurisdictional characterization does not inform 
what jurisdictional characteristics the doctrine does or does not have. 
Determining that is the next task, and, as I will show, I believe a case can be 
made for a mandatory characterization. 
The jurisdictional characterization inquiry already established that the 
doctrine should be susceptible to waiver and consent. Waiver and consent 
coincide with the function of the doctrine and its dignity rationale.159 They 
allow for the salutary effects of striking a balance between the importance of 
redressability for wrongs and important policy considerations involving the 
state and its fisc.160 And, they have been part and parcel of state sovereign 
immunity since the beginning of its long historical acceptance.161 These are 
powerful reasons why waiver and consent should be features of a 
nonjurisdictional state sovereign immunity doctrine. 
But the aptness of other features is less clear. There are at least three other 
features to consider: (1) whether the presence of immunity must be policed and 
raised by the court sua sponte; (2) whether immunity cannot be forfeited by the 
state; and (3) whether equitable considerations can prevent the invocation of, or 
circumvent the application of, state sovereign immunity. I think there are good 
reasons to answer all of these in the negative. 
1. No sua sponte requirement 
Must the existence of sovereign immunity as a bar to suit be raised by the 
court sua sponte if no party raises it? The answer is no, for three reasons. First, 
if the doctrine is nonjurisdictional, then there are few institutional reasons for 
the court to take an independent interest in immunity, and, generally, the parties 
should consider the underlying values adequately. Second, any noninstitutional 
reasons for the court to raise the issue on its own (such as the need to ensure 
that any consent, waiver, or forfeiture is voluntary and otherwise valid) are 
unlikely to be so important as to require sua sponte invocation by the court, 
158. Of course, cross-doctrinal consistency also could be achieved by rethinking the 
jurisdictional status of federal sovereign immunity. 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 125-28. 
160. See supra text accompanying note 129. 
161. See supra note 139. 
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particularly when balanced against the burden on the court to be forced to 
address the issue in each case. And, third, the Court itself has suggested that 
there is no sua sponte requirement.162 
That is not to say that a court may never raise the issue on its own.163 
There may be compelling reasons to do so in individual cases. For example, if 
it is unclear whether an entity is an arm of the state entitled to assert immunity 
or not, and the court cannot determine if the entity is consenting to suit or 
merely does not realize that it may be able to assert immunity, then a court may 
wish to raise the issue to determine whether or not the entity is truly consenting 
to suit. But these situations are more likely to come up on a case-by-case basis 
and should not entail a blanket requirement. It is far better, and more consonant 
with the underlying policies, to allow courts discretion to raise the issue when 
the need arises. In sum, courts should not be required to raise the immunity 
issue sua sponte. 
2. Forfeitability 
Forfeiture and waiver are slightly different. Waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a right; forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of 
the right.164 May immunity be forfeited by a state entitled to assert it? The best 
answer is yes, in my view, though arguments to the contrary are not without 
some merit. 
There are good reasons why immunity should be forfeitable like any other 
affirmative defense. Requiring the defense to be asserted in a timely fashion, 
such as in the answer, allows the issue to be litigated at the outset, potentially 
avoiding the waste of judicial and litigant resources if it is asserted late in 
litigation or for the first time on appeal. Also, requiring a timely assertion 
prevents the state from intentionally delaying the assertion for some tactical 
advantage. In addition, it promotes clarity, consistency, and fairness in the 
litigation.165 And, finally, if immunity exists in substantial part to protect states 
from the burdens of suit, it makes logical sense to require the defense to be 
raised as early in the litigation as possible. 
If immunity were difficult to determine, I might rethink forfeiture. After 
all, state sovereign immunity is designed to ensure respect for the states, and a 
rule that requires a decision whether or not to assert immunity at an early stage 
162. See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
163. Cf. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205-10 (2006) (allowing courts to raise the 
untimeliness of habeas petitions on their own even though the time bar is nonjurisdictional 
and does not require them to do so). 
164. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 
U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004) (acknowledging the distinction). 
165. Cf. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002) 
(suggesting that these are values that ought to be considered in immunity jurisprudence). 
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in the litigation when that decision cannot yet be made does not show much 
respect for the states and the doctrine of immunity. But the availability of 
immunity should be, in the vast majority of instances, readily apparent at the 
outset. Even if the availability of immunity is unclear, an entity usually can—
and will have ample incentive to—assert the defense early anyway.166 
There are two practical arguments against forfeiture, but they strike me as 
fairly weak. The first is that a no-forfeiture rule would protect those state 
entities that erroneously believed that they were not entitled to assert immunity 
but suddenly realized their mistake before the litigation ended but after the 
forfeiture deadline had expired. A no-forfeiture rule for those cases might 
enable a court to resolve whether the state entities had consented to suit 
voluntarily.167 
But, as I mentioned above in the context of the sua sponte discussion, these 
cases strike me as very rare indeed,168 and, to the extent they arise, defendants 
already have the opportunity to amend their answers to assert affirmative 
defenses previously omitted if justice so requires.169 The risk that a 
nonconsenting state entity will unknowingly forfeit an available immunity 
defense and be unable to assert it, particularly with the opportunity of a court to 
raise the issue sua sponte,170 seems extremely low and provides very little 
support for a no-forfeiture rule of state sovereign immunity. 
The second practical argument is that states may need time to consider 
carefully whether to waive immunity or not in specific cases, a decision that 
may not be able to be made without information from the discovery process. 
Respect for the states and their prerogative to invoke or waive immunity 
counsels against a strict and early forfeiture rule. 
This argument has some merit, but it is not clear to me, as an empirical 
matter, whether such situations come up often enough to justify it. Even if so, 
there is an easy solution: a state should assert the immunity defense in its 
answer but decline to move to dismiss the case before discovery171 and, 
instead, after discovery has closed, either waive immunity or move for 
summary judgment.172 The point is that the state can preserve its immunity 
against forfeiture by asserting it in a timely fashion but need not seek dismissal 
166. See, e.g., N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189 (2006) 
(entertaining the assertion of sovereign immunity by a county whose ability to invoke 
immunity was unclear). 
167. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (2000) (eliminating the forfeitability of the habeas 
exhaustion requirement to ensure that waiver was proper). 
168. One possible exception is Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See supra 
note 135. 
169. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a); cf. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205-10 (2006) 
(recognizing the utility of Rule 15 to assert defenses otherwise forfeited). 
170. See supra text accompanying note 162. 
171. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
DODSON 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 10/13/2008 4:25 PM 
October 2008] MANDATORY RULES 31 
ial court.”  
 
on the basis of immunity until it is ready to do so. 
The strongest argument in favor of a no-forfeiture rule is precedent. 
Although the Court has never said whether state sovereign immunity may be 
forfeited, two decisions hint otherwise. In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of 
Treasury,173 the Court allowed a state to assert sovereign immunity in a federal 
case for the first time on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.174 Ford implicated 
both waiver and forfeiture. The waiver issue was whether the attorney general 
had authority to waive the state’s immunity through his litigation conduct in the 
lower federal courts. The forfeiture issue was whether, independent of waiver, 
the state could be barred from asserting immunity because it did not do so in a 
timely fashion. 
Ford decided both issues in favor of the state’s retention of immunity. 
Ford held that the attorney general lacked authority to waive state immunity 
though litigation conduct.175 The Court overruled that holding in Lapides v. 
Board of Regents, holding instead that an attorney general can waive the state’s 
immunity through his litigation conduct.176 
But Ford also decided the forfeiture issue: 
The objection to petitioner’s suit as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment 
was first made and argued by Indiana in this Court. This was in time, however. 
The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit 
limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court 
will consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case even though 
urged for the first time in this Court.177 
Lapides did not overrule this forfeiture aspect of Ford. 
Similarly, in Edelman v. Jordan,178 the Court allowed the State to assert 
immunity successfully even though the State invoked immunity for the first 
time on appeal.179 The Court stated: “[I]t has been well settled since [Ford] 
that the Eleventh Amendment sufficiently partakes of the nature of a 
jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the tr 180
Ford and Edelman provide some support for a no-forfeiture rule of state 
sovereign immunity, but they are not unequivocal. A plausible reading of those 
cases is that, assuming immunity may be forfeited, forfeiture will be narrowly 
construed and the time limit to forfeiture may be quite long depending upon the 
173. 323 U.S. 459 (1945), overruled by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of 
Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 469. 
176. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 623 (overruling Ford). 
177. Ford, 323 U.S. at 467. 
178. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
179. See id. at 677-78 (considering the defense, though it was raised for the first time 
on appeal). 
180. Id. 
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circumstances.181 In addition, it is clear that both Ford and Edelman premised 
their holdings on the jurisdictional nature of state sovereign immunity. 
Reconsidering that jurisdictional premise in the careful and nuanced way that I 
propose here may undermine the skepticism of forfeiture evinced in Ford and 
Edelman. 
Ultimately, equivocal precedent should not stand in the way of the strong 
formalist and functional reasons for allowing state sovereign immunity to be 
forfeited. But it is a close call. And, if I am wrong, then I happily revert to my 
broader point: regardless of the specific balance struck here, we need a more 
nuanced lexicon to deal with doctrines like state sovereign immunity. 
Regardless of whether a mandatory characterization or some other 
characterization ultimately carries the day, the point is that some middle path 
provides a different, and perhaps better, way to conceptualize the doctrine. 
3. No availability of equity 
The final jurisdictional-like attribute to consider is the availability of equity 
to prevent an assertion of the immunity bar. Although a closer call, I think a 
persuasive argument can be made that state sovereign immunity resists 
application of equity. 
The availability of equity does not implicate the Ex parte Young doctrine. 
The Young doctrine allows a person otherwise barred by immunity to sue a 
state official for violations of federal law for prospective injunctive or 
declaratory relief.182 The Young doctrine does not hinge on the need for equity, 
however. The Young doctrine relies on the fiction that a state official is stripped 
of his state immunity when he violates federal law.183 An award of money 
damages would be, in effect, an award against the state when the fiction 
dictates that the state is not the real party in interest in the suit against the 
stripped officer.184 Thus, the distinction between injunctive relief and money 
damages protects the unconsenting state, which, under Young, is still cloaked 
with immunity, from being effectively the real party in interest to an officer 
suit. 
Later decisions have reinforced the fact that Young is not a decision based 
in equity. In Edelman, the Court struck down retrospective injunctive monetary 
relief, despite its characterization as “equitable restitution,” because the award 
would have come from the state fisc.185 The Court stated: 
We do not read Ex parte Young or subsequent holdings of this Court to 
181. Edelman, in particular, may have had good reason to allow the tardy assertion. 
See supra note 135. 
182. See supra note 147. 
183. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). 
184. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945). 
185. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664-68. 
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indicate that any form of relief may be awarded against a state officer, no 
matter how closely it may in practice resemble a money judgment payable out 
of the state treasury, so long as the relief may be labeled “equitable” in 
nature.186 
In other words, the Young doctrine does not subject immunity to the whims 
of equity. Rather, it arises from the need to end ongoing violations of federal 
law. The Young doctrine does not address the applicability of equity to state 
sovereign immunity. 
Equity may, however, come into play in the state’s otherwise proper 
assertion of immunity. In other words, might there be equitable reasons why a 
court could hear a claim against a nonconsenting state despite its otherwise 
proper invocation of immunity?187 
Two reasons suggest that the answer is no. First, the Court’s stringent 
waiver rules indicate that anything outside of a clear and voluntary waiver or 
declaration of consent will not deprive a state of its immunity right. For 
example, a state’s consent to suit is valid only if the consent was clear and 
unambiguous.188 In addition, waiver based on a state’s conduct will be applied 
only if the state voluntarily invokes the court’s jurisdiction.189 Finally, waivers 
that are coercive—that are obtained via a stick rather than a carrot—are not 
binding on the state.190 These cases suggest that equitable estoppel, to the 
extent that it is a kind of implied waiver or consent, should not be available to 
prevent a state from asserting immunity. 
Second, immunity is inherent in sovereignty, and, as a result, is of a 
mandatory and inflexible nature. The sovereign interests served by state 
sovereign immunity—deference to state dignity and protection of the state 
fisc—transcend notions of fairness that arise in the context of a specific 
litigation. (Indeed, they transcend notions of fairness in general by preventing 
186. Id. at 666; see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 282-88 
(1997) (refusing to apply the Young doctrine to a suit seeking prospective equitable relief 
that was the functional equivalent to a quiet title action against the state). 
187. See Pemrick v. Stracher, No. 92 CV 959(CLP), 2007 WL 1876504, at *8 n.16 
(E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007) (assuming that equitable estoppel could prevent a state from 
asserting immunity but finding that its application was unwarranted by the facts of the case); 
Hoskins v. Kaufman Indep. Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 303CV0130D, 2003 WL 22364356, at *1 
n.2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2003) (avoiding the issue). 
188. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n.9 (1984); 
Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944). 
189. Compare Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 
(2002) (finding waiver where the state removed the case to federal court), and Porto Rico v. 
Ramos, 232 U.S. 627, 631 (1914) (finding waiver where Puerto Rico petitioned to become a 
party), with Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 675-76 (1999) (abolishing the doctrine of constructive waiver of immunity based on a 
state’s participation in a federal regulatory scheme), and Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 
(1900) (refusing to find consent to suit in federal court based on a state’s consent to suit in 
state court). 
190. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 687. 
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an injured citizen from recovering against the state that wrongfully caused the 
injury.) They ought not be subject to the whim of circumstances or the parties’ 
actions, save where those actions manifest a valid waiver or consent by the 
state. 
In sum, a good argument can be made that state sovereign immunity might 
best be characterized as nonjurisdictional. Its principal function is to bestow a 
right upon a party rather than to limit the power of the courts. The availability 
of waiver and consent is an important and consistent corollary to sovereign 
immunity. And precedent is in tension with a jurisdictional characterization. 
These features all support a nonjurisdictional characterization of state sovereign 
immunity. In addition, good arguments support a mandatory characterization. 
The availability of waiver and consent, as just stated, are important and 
consistent components of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity need not be 
policed by the courts sua sponte, but it ought to be subject to forfeiture. Finally, 
the invocation of immunity should resist equitable constraints. For these 
reasons, we should consider characterizing state sovereign immunity as a 
mandatory but nonjurisdictional rule. 
CONCLUSION 
At one level, the goal of this Article is modest: to show why we need a 
deeper consideration of nonjurisdictional rules and a greater appreciation for 
their various manifestations, particularly mandatory rules. For statutes like 
§ 2107, the case is somewhat straightforward. A mandatory but 
nonjurisdictional characterization fits well with its statutory paradigm, purpose, 
effects, and precedent—far better even than the other characterizations offered 
by the Bowles majority and dissent. 
Going beyond statutes, however, taps into something much broader and 
more complex. As I have tried to show with state sovereign immunity, a 
willingness to embrace a middle path—such as mandatory rules—may provide 
additional avenues for conceptualizing and characterizing nonstatutory 
doctrines, which often are more amorphous and uncertain than their statutory 
counterparts. There are a host of them to consider. Prudential standing,191 
appellate certification,192 and exhaustion193 are just a few. These doctrines 
191. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Nancy E. ex rel. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 
2000) (holding prudential standing requirements to be nonjurisdictional). 
192. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (per curiam) (“[U]nder AEDPA, he 
was required to receive authorization from the Court of Appeals before filing his second 
challenge. Because he did not do so, the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain 
it.”). 
193. The Court has avoided resolving whether appellate exhaustion is jurisdictional. 
See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 90 (1997); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 
533 (1992); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 79 (1988). But see Carlson 
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17 n.2 (1980) (stating that the Court can decide issues that were not 
presented below when the respondent does not object, the issue was squarely presented and 
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ought not get stuck in the jurisdictional/nonjurisdictional false dichotomy that 
has trapped others. A greater appreciation for nonjurisdictional rules in general 
(and mandatory rules specifically) may provide a way out, as well as an 
opportunity to think more broadly about these doctrines and to give them a 
richer, more nuanced, character. 
At bottom, this Article is not so much about arguing for a specific 
characterization of state sovereign immunity or § 2107. After all, though I think 
the arguments for the mandatory but nonjurisdictional characterizations are 
strong, I am not so utterly convinced of them that I can rule out being 
persuaded otherwise. Rather, the broader goal is to develop more creative 
thinking about these difficult characterization issues, to open our minds to the 
myriad of possibilities that exist for them, and to resolve them with both 
honesty and principle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fully briefed, and it was an important, recurring issue). 
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